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The murder of Theo van Gogh, which 
sent a shock wave through the Nether-
lands, has been largely interpreted as 
the proof of an obvious failure of the 
multiculturalist approach that prevailed 
in the country at least until the electoral 
success of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. The 
crime appeared as the exacerbated ex-
pression of an Arab or “Muslim” culture 
unable to accept Western values. This 
could have been true, were the mur-
derer and his accomplices traditional 
Muslims, barely able to speak Dutch and 
from a tight-knit closed community of 
immigrants. But Van Gogh’s alleged kill-
er, Mohammed B, is a Dutch citizen, although born into a migrant family 
from Morocco. Two of those arrested —Jason W. and Jermaine W.— are 
Dutch-American converts to Islam. 
 
Trajectories of Muslim radicalization in Europe
Developments in the Netherlands have been very much in line 
with developments in the rest of Europe. Since the end of the 1980’s, 
both the Islam-related violence and the identity patterns of radicals, 
have corresponded to similar trends throughout Europe. The Brad-
ford demonstrations against Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (Janu-
ary 1988) represented the first open claim by Muslims living in the 
West that Islam should be protected in Europe against “blasphemy,” 
although the fatwa against Rushdie was launched by Ayatollah Kho-
meini in Iran for purely political reasons. In the summers of 1994 and 
1995 a string of terrorist actions had also been perpetrated by Islamic 
radicals in France. Many young European Muslims joined different ji-
hads in the world (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and, more 
recently, Iraq), and, although not all of them became terrorists, some 
did join al-Qaida (Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid). There have been 
some twenty European Muslims jailed in Guantanamo; even if many of 
them did not have direct connections with al-Qaida, they nevertheless 
all went to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many terrorist ac-
tions have been perpetrated or planned by young Muslims living in the 
West: the 9/11 pilots, the “Roubaix gang” (1996), the Jamal Beghal net-
work (2001), the Hamburg cell (accused of having provided logistical 
support to the 9/11 attack), even the group responsible for the Madrid 
deadly bombings of 2004, share common patterns.
The process of radicalization among second generation Muslims in 
Western Europe is therefore nothing new. They fall roughly into three 
categories: 1) second generation young males whose families usually 
originated from North-Africa, 2) young men who came from North Africa 
or the Middle-East and settled in the West either to study or to work, 3) 
converts who are often outcasts (non-Muslim racial minorities, usually 
black and/or Caribbean, former delinquents converted in jail, drug-ad-
dicts who found in Islam a way to quit addiction, or just “buddies” who 
joined their Muslim friends when the latter became “born-again”). All of 
them are fully westernized and usually keep aloof from the mainstream 
Muslims.1 The murder of Van Gogh was a consequence of the merging 
of two trends: the call to fight blasphemy, and the jumping of young 
westernized Muslims into “international jihadism.”
The westernization of these young radicals is obvious from many 
points: they are fluent in Western languages (and often do not speak 
Arabic), they often have citizenship in 
a Western country (Moussaoui, Mo-
hammed B.), marry European women 
(Daoudi, Beghal), have a Western par-
ent (the mother of Abdelkrim Mejjati, 
the Madrid ring leader, is French), and 
are born-again. Few if any went to a 
religious school. The weight of con-
verts in radical groups should never 
be underestimated: almost all radical 
and violent networks dismantled in 
Europe during the last ten years had 
at least one convert (Reid, Grandvizir, 
Courtailler, Ganczarski, to name a few). 
The group responsible for Van Gogh’s 
murder seems to fit these patterns: Mohammed B. speaks fluent Dutch, 
is a Dutch citizen, and is obviously a “born again,” who had a “normal” 
life until he became a fanatic; the other Moroccans involved in the case 
settled in Europe. Finally, we should note the presence of the converts, 
embodied by the two sons of a US black military officer and a Dutch 
woman, who went to Pakistan for religious and military training.
 
The de-culturalization of religion 
The uproar generated in the Netherlands by the murder concentrates 
on the issue of “multiculturalism,” which is now expressed in terms of 
a clash of cultures, although nobody can explain why no “traditional 
Muslim,” but only westernized Muslims and converts, were involved 
in the act. The answer is that what has been seen as an exception (a 
fanatical westernized Muslim) is precisely the norm: the more radical 
the terrorists, the more they do not embody a traditional culture or 
a culture at all. Islamic radicalization is a consequence of decultura-
tion and not the expression of a pristine culture. It is an endeavour to 
reconstruct a “pure” religion outside traditional or Western cultures, 
outside the very concept of culture itself.
All the present forms of Islamic religious radicalization (which I call 
“neo-fundamentalism,” and which do not necessarily entail violence 
or political radicalization), are both a product and an agent of decul-
turation and globalization. The Taliban in Afghanistan did not fight to 
defend a traditional culture against Western encroachments: on the 
contrary, they were initially on good terms with the US government 
and fought first of all against the traditional Afghan culture (I take 
the term culture here both in the sense of arts and literature, and 
in the anthropological sense of socially transmitted behaviour pat-
terns, beliefs, institutions). In the Muslim world, Salafis and Tablighis, 
whatever their differences, are all fighting against traditional Muslim 
cultures, accused of having distorted the pure Islam of its origins. 
Such a predication is very successful among segments of decultur-
ated second generation Muslims, who find in it an apology and a 
vindication of their own uprootedness: they prefer halal fast-food to 
traditional Muslim cuisines. The generation gap, coupled with a sense 
of disenfranchising, became suddenly of some value: the more they 
ignored their grandfather’s Islam, the more they had an opportunity 
to become “true Muslims.” Individualization of faith, self-teaching, 
generational gap, rejection of authority (including that of established 
religious leaders), loosening of family ties, lack of socialization with 
a broader community (including the ethnic community of their par-
ents), and withdrawal towards a small inward-looking group, akin to 
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issue, then, is not so much integration into Europe, but the status of the 
different European languages. Islam arrives in Europe at a time when 
European integration is weakening the political dimension of national 
identities. The traditional nation-states are fading away. At the same 
time, at the grass roots level, national cohesion seems also to vanish 
due to the consequences of immigration. European identities are in a 
process of recasting and new terms such as “Englishness,” “Dutchness,” 
“Frenchness” are emerging.
Europe historically used two models to deal with immigration: as-
similationism (France) and multiculturalism (Northern Europe). Both 
failed for the same reason: they ignored the de-linking of culture and 
religion. France rightly considered that imported cultures would fade 
away, but wrongly asserted that this would lead to individual assimi-
lation. Northern Europe considered that pristine cultures would be 
steady enough to maintain a cohesive community, which could keep 
the new generation under some sort of social control. It also failed in 
favour of a purely religious identity. In both cases, what emerges is a 
call to be recognized as “Muslims” and no more as “immigrants,” or as 
a “cultural minority.” This means that, although the initial approaches 
were very different, Europe is now facing the same challenge: how to 
deal with Islam as a “mere” religion. But the emergence of Islam as a 
mere religion does not create a divide between “East” and “West” but a 
realignment between conservative and religious values on one hand, 
versus progressive and liberal ideas on the other hand. But values are 
not the expression of a given culture. 
When Pim Fortuyn entered politics in the Netherlands on an anti-Is-
lamic agenda, it was not to defend traditional European values, but to 
protect the homosexual rights that had been won in the 1970s against 
a conservative Christian tradition. Interestingly enough, the Moroccan 
Imam el-Moumni, who triggered Fortuyn’s anger by saying in a radio 
broadcast that homosexuality is a disease and has to do with bestial-
ity, was not in line with traditional ulama, for whom homosexuality is 
a sin and thus should be punished by death. By calling it a disease, he 
took the same line as the Catholic church in modern times: exonerating 
the homosexual of sin as long as he does not practise it, but refusing 
to give him any legal rights as a homosexual, which, in the eyes of the 
church, is a modern and benevolent position.
The debate with Islam is in fact a European search for a European 
soul.
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a cult: all these factors show the extent of the process of 
deculturation of the radicals.
The quest for authenticity is no longer a quest to maintain 
a pristine identity, but to go back to and beyond this pris-
tine identity through a non-historical, abstract, and imag-
ined model of Islam. It is not an issue of nostalgia for a given 
country, for one’s youth or for family roots. In this sense, 
“westernization” means something other than becoming 
Western, hence the ambivalent attitude towards it. But such 
behaviours do not necessarily lead to violence, although 
they provide a fertile ground. There are two elements that 
could explain the violence. The first issue is that such radi-
cals are not linked to any real community. Their community 
is not rooted in a given society or culture, and hence has to 
be reconstructed and experienced as an act of faith. They 
refer to a virtual ummah (community of believers) whose ex-
istence relies on their behaviour and deeds. The obsession 
about blasphemy and apostasy goes along with the vanish-
ing of the social authority of Islam. The “dreamed” commu-
nity becomes a “nightmared” one. The issue of “boundary” 
comes to the fore. By slaughtering a “blasphemer” Moham-
med B. literally inscribed the boundary on his victim’s throat. 
Do not trespass.
 If we examine patterns of other terrorists we can observe a different 
and more political approach: their targets are the same as the tradition-
al targets of the Western ultra-left of the seventies (US imperialism), 
and not Christianity as such. Even if they achieved a level of mass mur-
der unknown to their predecessors, they still followed the path opened 
by Baader Meinhof, the Red Brigades, and Carlos. The proponents of 
the “clash of civilizations” should look at the footages of the hostage 
takings in Iraq: the “trial” of a blind-folded hostage under the banner 
of a radical organization, the “confession” of the hostage, followed by 
his execution, are literally borrowed from the staging technique of the 
Italian Red Brigades when they captured and killed the former Prime 
minister Aldo Moro in 1978.
 
Beyond multiculturalism
Nevertheless, the reaction of the Dutch society overwhelmingly in-
terpreted the murder of Van Gogh in terms of the failure of multicultur-
alism. Multiculturalism has suddenly been seen as negative. But going 
from positive to negative means that the intellectual paradigm of mul-
ticulturalism is still at work. Multiculturalism has obviously failed, but 
for a different reason: the culture one is referring to is disappearing 
and this is the real cause of violence. At a time when the territorial bor-
ders between the great civilizations are fading away, mental borders 
are being reinvented to give a second life to the ghost of lost civiliza-
tions: multiculturalism, minority groups, clash or dialogue of civiliza-
tions, communautarisation and so on. Ethnicity and religion are called 
to draw new borders between groups whose identity relies on a per-
formative definition: we are what we say we are, or what others say 
we are. These new ethnic and religious borders do not correspond to 
any geographical territory or area. They work in minds, attitudes, and 
discourses. They are more vocal than territorial, but also so much more 
eagerly endorsed and defended because they have to be invented, 
and because they remain fragile and transitory. De-territorialization of 
Islam leads to a quest for definition, because Islam is no longer embed-
ded in territorial cultures, whatever their diversity, which is, by the way, 
always experienced from outside.
The crisis of the concept of culture is also obvious in the West. It is 
interesting to see how the way Islam is perceived as a threat is differ-
ent from one European country to the other. In France the “headscarf 
affair” amounted to a debate on French national identity, while the idea 
that veiled schoolgirls are a problem is just seen as silly in Great Britain. 
This does not mean that Great Britain is more tolerant than France: in 
the UK it is strictly forbidden to slaughter animals the “halal” way, while 
in France it has never been a problem. The issue of animal protection 
in Northern Europe is almost a civilizational one (nobody seems to 
have given thought to the fact that Pim Fortuyn was killed by an ani-
mal rights activist). The language issue is also complex. In France and 
Great Britain, Muslims do speak the language of their host European 
country, and often before their arrival to Europe. In Holland many do 
not, although if they plan to stay in the country they must follow “en-
culturation courses” which include intensive language instruction. The 
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 Note
1. See my Globalised Islam (London: Hurst 
& Co., 2004), Chap. 7; see also Marc 
Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks 
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